Closing Pandora’s Box: Sexual Predators and the
Politics of Sexual Violence
Eric S. Janus∗
Sexually violent predator (“SVP”) commitment laws offer a
dangerous but seductive promise. In exchange for perfect protection
against a few of the most reviled and dangerous criminals—those who
prey sexually on women and children—we need only remove from
those individuals the protection of our most fundamental
constitutional limitations on government power.
We reassure
ourselves that our molestation of these constitutional protections is
safely limited. Unfortunately, we are finding that the seduction of
public protection is too strong a force. SVP laws entail a logic that
pushes our thinking and approach to sexual violence ever further off
balance and demands increasing investment in their strategies. Like
Pandora’s box, these new laws, which seemed attractive at first, now
seem excessive, but cannot, given the political context in which they
exist, be abandoned or limited.
SVP laws make an extraordinary moral and constitutional claim:
We permit our government—despite its democratic values—to pick
out a small group of people and treat them in a way that we would
never allow ourselves to be treated. We allow this group—and only
this group—to be locked up to prevent unspecified crimes that they
might (or might not) commit at some unspecified time in the future.
These laws violate a fundamental premise of our constitutional
system: As a general matter, the State can take away a person’s
physical liberty only if he or she is charged with a specific crime, and
convicted of that crime according to a set of strict procedural
1
protections. As Justice Jackson stated in Williamson v. United States,
∗
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“Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but
unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so
fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort
to it.”
2
How did it come to pass that sixteen states, in adopting SVP
laws, have been willing to compromise the “great safeguards which
the law adopts [to protect individuals] in the punishment of crime
3
and the upholding of justice”? The story begins in the late 1980s.
Heinous crimes, committed by sex offenders just released from
prison, created a political environment that demanded action.
Despite their toxicity to the protection of liberty, SVP laws proved too
hard to resist. Policymakers chose these laws precisely because they
allowed a fundamental bypass of constitutional protections. A
Minnesota task force, for example, recommended the use of SVP laws
to circumvent three procedural safeguards inherent in the criminal
4
justice system. First, the criminal justice system requires in-court
testimony to prove a crime, whereas SVP commitments make liberal
use of hearsay evidence embedded in the expert testimony. Thus,
the task force surmised, SVP laws can protect society against
“individuals . . . who may not have been convicted of a sex offense,
because of the reluctance of young and/or scared victims to testify
5
against perpetrators of sexual abuse.” Second, SVP laws circumvent
the limits imposed by strict burdens of proof by allowing the
confinement of individuals who “may be dangerous but evade
2

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-3701 to -3717 (2003) (effective July 1, 1996); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–6609.3 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004) (effective Oct. 11,
1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910–.931 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004) (effective Jan. 1,
1999); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1–/99 (2002 & Supp. 2004) (effective Jan. 1, 1998);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229A.1–.16 (West Supp. 2004) (effective May 6, 1998); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a21 (Supp. 2003) (effective July 1, 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 123A, §§ 1–16 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004) (effective Jan. 14, 1994); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 253B.01–.23 (West 2002) (effective May 22, 1997); MO. ANN. STAT. §§
632.480–.513 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004) (effective Jan. 1, 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
30:4-27.24 to .38 (West Supp. 2004) (effective Aug. 12, 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
25-03.1-01 to -46 (2002 & Supp. 2003) (effective Apr. 8, 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4448-10 to -170 (Law. Co-op. 2002 & Supp. 2003) (effective June 5, 1998); TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.147 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (effective Sept. 1, 1999);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-70.1 to .19 (Michie Supp. 2003) (effective Jan. 1, 2003); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010–.902 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004) (effective July 1, 1990);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01–.13 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) (effective June 2, 1994).
3
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 366 (1996) (quoting United States v.
Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 288 (S.D. Ala. 1906)).
4
Psychopathic Personalities Subcommittee, Report, in MINNESOTA DEPT. OF
HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER: COMMITMENT ACT TASK FORCE 45, 4850 (1988).
5
Id. at 45.
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conviction due to the high burden of proof required in criminal
6
cases.” Third, because SVP laws are not limited by double jeopardy
and ex post facto protections, they can compensate for the
“comparatively short correctional sentences” for sex offenders by
confining individuals after they have completed their criminal
7
sentences.
The original SVP laws, passed in the early 1990s, were
immediately challenged in court. Although the attacks took several
legal forms, at bottom they all argued that SVP laws violated the
fundamental compact limiting the state’s power to deprive us of our
8
liberty.
The constitutional issues badly divided the courts that
considered them. In the end, by a five-to-four vote, the United States
9
But the courts’
Supreme Court upheld the use of SVP laws.
imprimatur has been conditional. Recognizing that SVP laws create
an escape from the strict limits of the criminal law, the courts have
held that SVP laws must be reserved for the “extraordinary”; they
10
must be severely limited.
The central imperative for civil
commitment is that it must remain secondary to the criminal justice
system as a tool for social control. As the Minnesota Supreme Court
stated, “[S]ubstantive due process forecloses the substitution of
preventive detention schemes for the criminal justice system, and the
judiciary has a constitutional duty to intervene before civil
commitment becomes the norm and criminal prosecution the
11
exception.”
Thus, the effort to justify SVP commitment laws centered on
6

Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
8
See, e.g., In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn.) (considering assertions that
laws violate due process and equal protection), cert. denied, Blodgett v. Minnesota,
513 U.S. 849 (1994); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993) (rejecting challenge
based on ex post facto and double jeopardy violations).
9
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
10
See In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Minn. 1996) (Gardebring, J.,
dissenting) (describing SVP commitment as “the extraordinary sanction of indefinite
commitment without periodic judicial review”).
11
In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 183 (Minn. 1996). The Hendricks Court
acknowledges this principle as well, suggesting that at least part of the role of mental
disorder is to provide a constitutionally adequate boundary around the use of civil
confinement to accomplish social control goals:
This admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of
future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other
dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with
exclusively through criminal proceedings. Hendricks’ diagnosis as a
pedophile, which qualifies as a “mental abnormality” under the Act,
thus plainly suffices for due process purposes.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997).
7
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courts giving assurances that the “reduced-protection” zone was
exceptional because it applied only to a small group of people. More
importantly, through these assurances, proponents of SVP
commitment laws sought to show that the unfortunate group whose
rights were to be curtailed was not just small numerically, but also
somehow different in kind from the rest of us. In this way, we could
all rest assured that what we are doing to “them” could not, in the
future, be done to “us.”
States and courts made three promises in an effort to reassure
themselves and the rest of us that SVP laws would be extremely
limited in their application. First, they promised that confinement
would be numerically small because the laws would be directed only
12
at the “most dangerous.” Second, they promised that the targets
would different in kind from the rest of us because only the “mentally
13
disordered” would be locked up.
Third, they promised that
confinement would be limited because treatment would be provided
and that “patients” would be released from confinement as soon as
14
they were no longer dangerous or mentally disordered.
Although these assurances were motivated in the first instance by
constitutional concerns, there is a second, more utilitarian reason for
the promise of limitations: SVP programs are very expensive, so
policymakers promised that the programs would not continue to
grow in size and expense, and that the extraordinary cost of an SVP
commitment would be reserved for cases in which the danger to the
community was extraordinarily high.
A basic principle of
15
criminology—the principle of “selective incapacitation” —as well as
common sense, support this utilitarian principle by which the
intensity of intervention is proportional to the risk posed by the
16
individual.
Over the years I have argued, in law review articles and court
briefs, that these promises were empty window dressing. First, the
12

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 364 (1997) (reasoning that SVP laws “tak[e]
great care to confine only a narrow class of particularly dangerous individuals”).
13
Id. at 358 (“We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have
coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a
‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’”).
14
See, e.g., Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995) (noting
requirement for provision of treatment and for release when “if no reasonable
relation exists between the original reason for commitment and the continued
confinement”).
15
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 34-36, 143-44, 169-71 (1995).
16
Eric S. Janus, Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an EmpiricallyBased Prevention Policy Be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1083, 1116 (2003).
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“most dangerous” claim is dubious because of the limitations in our
ability to predict dangerousness. The claim has been further
undercut by court decisions that systematically fail to set high,
17
consistent, and accountable standards for risk assessment. Second,
the “mental disorder” limitation is untenable because it is so vague
18
and broad that it excludes almost no one. Finally, the promise of
treatment and time-limited confinement is belied by the almost nonexistent treatment graduation rates in SVP programs across the
19
country.
THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE
My purpose in this Article is not to rehearse the systematic
betrayal of these constitutional promises. Rather, I report on an
equally serious problem. Even when state officials have taken the
limitations on SVP commitments seriously, their efforts, when
“exposed” by the media, have been truncated by a firestorm of
popular and political obstruction.
I summarize here the recent events in Minnesota and Wisconsin,
two of the original SVP states. Their programs are now a decade or
more old. The central lesson of these stories is that the politics of
sexual violence, as framed by SVP laws and popular passion, will not
let us close this Pandora’s box. Ultimately, it will be both society at
large and future victims of sexual violence who suffer, because the
expense of SVP programs is wildly out of proportion to their benefit.
As more and more resources pour into SVP programs, the distortion
in policy and resource allocation will become more and more
20
severe. Society will suffer because of the resource drain, and victims
will suffer because these SVP programs will draw more and more
resources away from programs that address the great bulk of sexual
violence in the community.
I draw these conclusions by examining recent events in
17

See Janus, supra note 16, at 1110-11; Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the
Legal Standard for Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 33 (1997); Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, The Forensic
Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and
Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443 (2003).
18
See Eric S. Janus, Foreshadowing the Future of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 1279 (1998); Eric S. Janus, Sex Offender Commitments: Debunking the Official
Narrative and Revealing the Rules in Use, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 71 (1997).
19
See W. Lawrence Fitch, Sexual Offender Commitment in the United States: Legislative
and Policy Concerns, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 489, 492-93 (2003); Eric S. Janus &
Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually
Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 323 (2003).
20
See Janus, supra note 16, at 1101-09.
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Minnesota and Wisconsin. As noted, these are two of the original
SVP states, and their programs are among the most mature in the
nation. The events are echoed, however, in other mature programs,
such as Washington’s, and are beginning to beset California’s newer
program. We can safely assume that the same experience will befall
other SVP programs as they mature, as well.
Minnesota
The Minnesota Sex Offender Program (“MSOP”) was designed
by Dr. Michael Farnsworth, the director of forensic psychiatry for the
state. The program’s design was based on Farnsworth’s research into
the state of the art of sex offender treatment nationwide. It was
designed as a step-level program, and, in my opinion, Dr. Farnsworth
truly believed that many of the men committed could work their ways
through the program and “graduate” in a matter of two to four
21
years.
There were indications that Minnesota took its constitutional
and programmatic mandates seriously. For example, the per diem
expense for the Minnesota program has been among the highest in
22
the nation, and the Minnesota treatment program is cited as the
23
national model. While other states housed their SVP programs in
24
correctional settings, or used old jail buildings (New Jersey, for
example), Minnesota built a new facility, disconnected from any
25
prison, to house its SVP program. Finally, the State funded the
26
development of an actuarial tool to assess the risk of recidivism.
21

See Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1995). In Call, a 1995 Minnesota
Supreme Court case, the court relied on representations of state officials stating that
an “average patient” was expected to complete the “intensive” treatment program in
a “minimum of 24 months.” Id. at 319 n.5. Later, treatment officials described the
length of treatment as at least four years. E-mail from Anita Schlank, Ph.D., thenClinical Director of Minnesota Sex Offender Program, to Eric S. Janus (Aug. 19,
2002) [hereinafter E-mail from Schlank] (noting that most patients are unable to
complete the program in the minimum period) (on file with author).
22
Fitch, supra note 19, at 493.
23
See Anita Schlank et al., The Minnesota Sex Offender Program, in THE SEXUAL
PREDATOR: LAW, POLICY, EVALUATION AND TREATMENT 10-14 (Anita Schlank & Fred
Cohen eds., 1999) (describing the Minnesota program and noting its national
prominence).
24
Roxanne Lieb, State Policy Perspective on Sexual Predator Laws, in PROTECTING
SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 46-51 tbl.
2.2 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. LaFond eds., 2003).
25
Conrad deFiebre, Psychopathic Sex Offenders Get New Home, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRIB., Nov. 5, 1995, at 1B.
26
MINN. STAT. § 244.052(2) (1996); Douglas L. Epperson et al., Minnesota Sex
Offender Screening Tool—Revised (MnSOST-R): Development, Validation, and Recommended
Risk
Level
Cut
Scores
(Dec.
2003),
at
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Of course, there were many ways in which the assurances about
the law were belied. The most significant of these, the promise of
progress through the treatment program, simply did not materialize.
Thus, the population of the MSOP kept growing as new
commitments continued apace, no patients were released, and only a
small handful of detainees managed to achieve, and maintain, the
highest levels of treatment at which some form of release might be
27
contemplated.
By 1998, the failed promise of the treatment program began to
be noticed. In a report to the Legislature in 1998, the Minnesota
Department of Corrections projected a rapid growth in the
population under commitment, and a concomitant growth in the
28
costs of the SVP program.
Concern about the growing costs led to several changes in the
MSOP. For example, the State developed a satellite replica of the
program in a prison. This program was aimed at imprisoned sex
offenders in an effort to reduce the number of released sex offenders
29
who required civil commitment. Officials also began to examine
why the treatment program had almost non-existent treatment
completion and discharge rates. Officials focused on the fact that
committed individuals were not equally competent in navigating the
rather complex “cognitive behavioral” treatment program and that
committed individuals varied widely in the level and nature of the risk
30
that they posed.
For example, then-clinical director, Dr. Anita
Schlank, reported at a symposium held in November 2002 that about
twenty-five percent of the committed men could be managed, with

http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/epperson/TechUpdatePaper12-03.pdf
(last visited June 15, 2004).
27
Janus, supra note 16, at 1090.
28
See MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., CIVIL COMMITMENT STUDY GROUP, REPORT TO
LEGISLATURE 21 (1998), available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us/publications/
socpublications.htm (last visited June 15, 2004).
29
Cf. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer stated that the Kansas SVP Act:
did not provide Hendricks (or others like him) with any treatment
until after his release date from prison and only inadequate treatment
thereafter. These, and certain other, special features of the Act
convince me that it was not simply an effort to commit Hendricks
civilly, but rather an effort to inflict further punishment upon him.
Id.; cf. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., PROGRAMS FOR SEX OFFENDERS, available at
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/publications/pdf/Sex%20Offender%20Programs.pdf
(last visited June 15, 2004).
30
See Eric S. Janus & Nancy Walbek, Sex Offender Commitments in Minnesota: A
Descriptive Study of Second Generation Commitments, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 343 (2000).
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31

proper supervision, in the community.
The Fiscal Year 2003
Operational Plan for the Minnesota Department of Human Services
(“DHS”) proposed an “alternate treatment track for individuals who
32
chronically refuse to participate in sex offender program[s].”
Officials also proposed the development of “appropriate clinical
pathways based on client characteristics, rather than commitment
status,” a project that will involve identifying “patients whose
treatment needs are not currently being adequately met (as indicated
33
via lack of progress toward less restrictive settings).”
All of this planning came to an apparent halt in June 2003,
however, with the publication of an article in the Twin Cities’ Star
Tribune newspaper entitled, State Looks to Release Sexual Psychopaths; Is
Concern for Offenders, or the Lock-Up Program’s High Cost, Driving
34
Change?
Referring to the aforementioned planning, the article
characterized officials as “looking for ways to release into the
community some of the 190 sexual psychopaths . . . . These repeat
rapists and pedophiles . . . have been declared sexually dangerous by
35
judges . . . .” According to the article, the officials who run the
program felt that they had fulfilled only part of their legal
obligation—to protect the public—and had neglected the other
part—”giving sexual psychopaths in their care individualized
36
treatment in the least prison-like settings possible.”
The article
stated that “sex psychopaths” would be released under strict
supervision and that officials can “manage—but not eliminate—risk
37
to the community.”
The article also suggested that intense
supervision could achieve a recidivism rate of ten percent. It painted
31

E-mail from Schlank, supra note 21:
[W]e estimated that there were approximately 48 individuals who were
likely not an escape risk and if, at the time of their commitment, there
had been a residential treatment program that accepted Level Three
sex offenders and could ensure that they were observed around-theclock and prevented from any access to potential victims, it seemed
possible that they could have been placed there with a “stayed
commitment” hanging over their head in case they did not succeed.
However, Dr. Schlank qualified her statement by acknowledging that “in no way do I
consider myself an expert on assessing escape risk.” Id.
32
STATE OPERATED FORENSIC SERVICES, OPERATIONAL PLAN B, FISCAL YEAR 2003
(2003) (appearing as the first item under heading “Product & Related Tasks”).
33
Id.
34
Josephine Marcotty, State Looks to Release Sexual Psychopaths; Is Concern for
Offenders, or the Lock-Up Program’s High Cost, Driving Change?, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB.,
June 22, 2003, at 1A.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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the officials as discounting this risk to the community in order to
satisfy the rights of the sex offenders: “More important [than the risk
to the community], they say, the state has a legal obligation to
38
provide effective treatment.”
The article quoted the Democratic Attorney General, who
characterized the plan as being a consequence of the Republican
Governor’s “no new taxes pledge”: “‘This whole no-new-tax pledge is
having an unyielding consequence to the public,’ said Attorney
General Mike Hatch, whose office petitions to have sexually
dangerous offenders committed for many counties. ‘To keep a few
bucks in people’s pockets, we are going to let sexual predators out to
39
harm people.’” A prominent prosecutor was quoted as mocking the
claim that offenders released to the community would be adequately
supervised. Referring to the projected ten percent recidivism rate for
released offenders, the article stated, “Some prosecutors don’t see
one-in-10 recidivism rate as a success story, especially since no one
40
can predict which sex offender will rape again.”
The story remained in the headlines for several weeks, while the
Attorney General and the Governor attacked each other and traded
41
ascriptions of blame.
Finally, the Governor issued an Executive
Order that directed the DHS officials not to release anyone unless
42
“required by law or ordered by a court.” The media reported that
the Governor’s Chief of Staff explained the meaning and intent of
the Executive Order in this way: “The governor doesn’t want these
guys to get out, and he’s made that clear ever since he was running
43
for office.”
The Minnesota SVP crisis entered a second stage in November
2003 with the tragic disappearance of college student Drew Sjodin in
East Grand Forks, North Dakota, just west of the border with
Minnesota. Soon after her disappearance, Alfonso Rodriguez was
arrested and charged with her kidnapping. Rodriguez had been
released from a Minnesota prison some seven months before and was

38

Id.
Id.
40
Marcotty, supra note 34.
41
See, e.g., Mark Brunswick, Pawlenty Criticizes Hatch, Article; Governor Says Debate
over Star Tribune’s Sex-Offender Story Is Being Pushed by Politics, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB.,
June 24, 2003, at 1B; Lori Sturdevant, Editorial, Versus Hatch, Pawlenty Prevailed,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 29, 2003, at 9AA.
42
Exec. Order No. 03-10, 28 Minn. Reg. 57 (July 21, 2003).
43
Warren Wolfe, Sex Offender Release Rules Are Changed; Pawlenty’s Executive Order,
in Effect, Will Keep Pyschopaths Locked Up, Chief of Staff Says, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB.,
July 11, 2003, at 1B (quoting Chief of Staff Charlie Weaver).
39
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44

classified as a “Level 3” sex offender, a label reserved for offenders
45
with a “high risk” to reoffend.
In many ways, the incident was an archetypal case and
immediately entered the national spotlight. Sjodin was a young,
blond college student, abducted and (many assumed) raped and
possibly murdered by a stranger—an older male, repeat sex offender
(who is a Mexican-American, perhaps making the archetypal salience
of the alleged crime even stronger). One newspaper article, assessing
why the Sjodin case caught the nation’s attention, surmised, “part of
the answer may be in Dru Sjodin’s smile: Beauty to the Beast some
people see in Rodriguez, released from captivity in May after serving
46
23 years for vicious attacks on women.”
The case reignited the political finger pointing between the
Governor and the Attorney General.
The debate was now
transformed, moving as if scripted, to the next dramatic level. In
place of the hypothetical future release from commitment of
moderate-risk offenders, the new story focused on a real victim and a
real offender and a real crime.
The story line immediately focused on why and how this “level 3
sex offender” was not civilly committed. The Attorney General
accused the Governor of allowing this individual to be released; the
Governor and his Commissioner of Corrections blamed their
subordinates for “bad judgment” and promised to seek disciplinary
action and “removal” of the state workers responsible for
47
recommending against commitment.
The Governor proposed
reinstating the death penalty in Minnesota, a state which had
48
abolished the ultimate penalty some one hundred years earlier.
The crisis focused attention on the process by which offenders
are selected for commitment. As if it were reporting a scoop, a Star
Tribune headline disclosed, Hurdles High for Offender Commitment; Many
Most Likely to Commit Sex Crimes Again Are Released After Prison Rather
49
Than Institutionalized. The body of the article gave the details: “Since
44

Chuck Haga, Suspect Held in Abduction; Sex Offender Charged in Dru Sjodin Case,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 2, 2003, at 1A.
45
MINN. STAT. § 244.052 3(e) (1996) (defining a level III sex offender as “an
offender whose risk assessment score indicates a high risk of reoffense”).
46
Chuck Haga, High Publicity of Sjodin Case Puzzles Some; Why Has This
Abduction Had Such Lasting Attention?, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 7, 2003, at 1A.
47
Patricia Lopez, Governor Cites Bad Judgment on Rodriguez; Pawlenty Faulted
Corrections Staffers in Release of Convict, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 19, 2003, at 1A.
48
Conrad deFiebre, Death Penalty Vote Is Urged; Gov. Pawlenty Called for a
Constitutional Referendum on the Issue, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Jan. 28, 2004, at 1B.
49
Josephine Marcotty & John Stefany, Hurdles High for Offender Commitment; Many
Most Likely to Commit Sex Crimes Again Are Released after Prison Rather Than
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1999, three-fourths of the rapists and pedophiles most likely to
reoffend were released in Minnesota instead of being committed for
50
indefinite treatment at a secure psychiatric facility.”
The article
continued:
The data show that commitment of offenders like Rodriguez is
not driven only by how dangerous they are. It is also governed by
the very high standards set by state law and the courts. And all
along the way, the individual judgments of psychologists,
prosecutors and judges can influence the outcome, making it
51
appear almost arbitrary.

The article reported that “controversy is becoming focused on the
validity of how corrections and justice officials choose who should be
52
committed and why.” The newspaper noted that some offenders
who had been assessed in the actuarial risk assessment as in the
highest risk group had not been committed, while others assessed as
53
a more moderate risk were committed.
An editorial in the Star Tribune shaped and reflected the nature
54
of the debate.
The questions, according to the editorial, were
whether the system is “too lax,” and how could an offender “officially
classified by the state as a sexual predator” not be referred for civil
55
commitment?
Claiming that releasing a person like Rodriguez
seems “wildly risky,” the editorial then posed a question to which
Minnesotans deserve “a better explanation”: “Did they make a serious
error, or did they take a gamble—hoping to save the cash a
56
commitment would consume?”
Eventually, the Governor and Commissioner of Corrections
settled on a strategy of referring all “Level 3” sex offenders to county
prosecutors for consideration of civil commitment. The Corrections
Commissioner explained, “she ordered the change to ensure that
prosecutors familiar with the laws review all Level 3 offenders for
possible civil commitments. Now only corrections officials do the
57
initial reviews and referrals.” This plan amounted to a shifting of

Institutionalized, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Jan. 11, 2004, at 1A.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Rodriguez; What to Do with Sex Predators?, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 4, 2003,
at 26A.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Paul Gustafson, Level 3 Offender Reviewal Changed, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec.
5, 2003, at 1B.
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the responsibility (and, hence, blame) for making judgments about
sex offender commitments from a centralized process of the
58
Department of Corrections to eighty-seven county attorneys. The
Commissioner of Corrections “defended that response as necessary to
59
ensure ‘that we don’t miss somebody who should be committed.’”
The deliberations then shifted to the legislature with over fifty
60
bills introduced to address the problem.
In the midst of this
legislative frenzy, the Democrat-Farmer-Labor Party began running “a
caustic television commercial” accusing the Republican Governor of
61
“bungling the release of sexual predators.”
The Star Tribune
described the ad in a front page story: “Over foreboding music, the
camera narrows in on [Governor] Pawlenty’s eyes and a narrator says:
‘These eyes just watched as administrative bungling and the wrong
budget priorities let rapists and sexual predators back on our
62
streets.’”
Wisconsin
The developments in Wisconsin, a Midwestern state similar in
many ways to Minnesota, offer an instructive comparative case study.
Wisconsin’s SVP program was, like Minnesota’s, one of the original
three modern SVP laws. Both programs grew consistently but
moderately over the initial years of their operation, with Wisconsin’s
63
reaching a population of 260 in the fall of 2003, compared with two
64
hundred in Minnesota.
Wisconsin’s program differed from
Minnesota’s in two notable respects. First, the Wisconsin and
58
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2464, 2486, 2508, 2543, 2544, 2548, 2817, 2822, 2855, 2882, 2901, 2925, 2929, 2938,
2951, 3030, 3057.) The identical search targeting legislation introduced in 2003
yielded only nine bills.
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Minnesota courts diverged in their interpretations of their respective
discharge standards. In Wisconsin, the courts had held that an
individual must be released if his risk of reoffense fell below the
65
threshold for commitment, substantial probability of reoffense. The
Minnesota courts, in contrast, had held that discharge would be
permitted only if the individual could make an acceptable adjustment
to society, a standard that suggests a lower level of risk than the
66
“highly likely” standard required for commitment in Minnesota.
The second difference is likely more significant. Prior to 2000,
Wisconsin, like Minnesota, had a policy limiting supervised releases
to individuals who had completed the prescribed treatment program.
In 2000, Wisconsin treatment officials liberalized the criteria
employed by state evaluators to include individuals whose risk could
be “managed safely” in the community. According to news accounts,
this change caused the rate of recommendations for supervised
67
release to double. By the fall of 2003, the number of persons who
had been released, either conditionally or absolutely, from
68
Wisconsin’s program reached about thirty-nine. Of that number, a
fair proportion had been returned to the institution because of “rule
violations,” but the news media reported no instances of sexual
69
reoffenses by released individuals.
As described above, Minnesota officials were working on a
similar change in policy in the summer of 2003 when the press
reported the plans, triggering the first chapter of the political
firestorm and effectively putting stop to those plans. In September of
the same year, some three months later, the press in Wisconsin
discovered and exposed Wisconsin’s liberal standards for release. A
front-page headline in Milwaukee’s Journal Sentinel blared, State Tops
70
in Release of Sexual Predators.
The news report triggered immediate legislative proposals to
tighten release standards. Within two days, the sponsors of the
original SVP law proposed lowering the standard for commitment
from “substantially probable” to “probable” to reoffend, thereby
71
changing the standard for discharge as well.
The proposal also
required “progress in treatment” as a condition for supervised
65
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72

release. A follow-up Journal Sentinal article quoted the director of
the secure facility as pointing out that the existing discharge
standards would allow community placements of individuals whose
risk of reoffense was below seventy-five percent but that “[i]t’s not a
73
determination that the person is safe.” Thus, one of the sponsors of
the legislation stated, “The standard needs to fall to the side of
74
protecting of public safety.”
In a subsequent article, the Journal Sentinel described the state’s
policy as “a practice quietly implemented within the state
[Department of Health and Family Services]” and characterized it as
75
having “turned the law upside down.” This sentiment was echoed in
an editorial in the Appleton Post-Crescent, which weighed in to support
the tightening of standards. The paper opined that the “idea” of the
SVP law was to “minimize” the risk to the community, and criticized
the legal standard for release:
An offender has to be deemed “substantially probable” to reoffend to be denied release. That means an offender who is only
“probable” or, say, “slightly probable” would have to be released.
Someone who is “probable” to commit another sexual offense can
rejoin the community, with supervision? No way. No wonder
76
communities are rejecting these guys.

Meanwhile, the state’s efforts to find community placements for
committed offenders were meeting another obstacle, as citizens
voiced “virulent opposition” to proposals to house offenders in their
77
neighborhoods. In September 2003, the press reported that the
third proposed location for convicted child molester Billy Lee
Morford—a home on a dead-end street in a mostly industrial area—
was scuttled when “a homeowner bowed to public pressure and
78
withdrew an offer to rent.” The president of the local Apartment
Association was quoted as saying that he “would advise against anyone
renting to Morford. . . . ‘Nobody wants to touch this,’ [he] said. ‘You
don’t want to have your neighbors protesting and marching in front
79
of your house. You can’t blame people for not renting to him.’”
72
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The case of pedophile Shawn Schulpius was even more extreme.
A judge had ordered him released to a community placement facility
in 1997, but the state claimed to be unable to locate a placement that
would accept him. In 2004, Schulpius sought a remedy from the state
court of appeals, but the court rejected his claim, holding, in a split
decision, that “the state acted in good faith in attempting to find
placement for Schulpius and that its failure to do so did not rise to
80
the level of a violation of his due process rights.”
LESSONS ABOUT THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE
The lessons from Minnesota and Wisconsin are straightforward.
Efforts to hew to the limiting-assurances for SVP laws will be
politically unacceptable, even when they are abstract and
hypothetical and have not had any demonstrable negative effect on
public safety. When a real tragedy occurs, the media and politicians
will interpret the tragedy as a failure to use the SVP tool broadly
enough. Moves will be made to broaden the SVP net. Rare but
archetypal crimes—the “Beauty and the Beast” paradigm—will form
the template against which solutions to the problem of sexual
violence are measured. Lost in the fog will be the great bulk of
sexual abuse that does not fit this mold.
The stories illustrate the immense political energy inherent in
these archetypal stories of sexual violence. In Wisconsin, “virulent
opposition” has thwarted the law’s command that graduates from the
SVP program be placed in the community. The courts of Wisconsin
81
have apparently bowed to the public will on this issue. A similar
story is being spun out in California, where the first several graduates
of that state’s SVP program are seeking community housing.
Reported one paper, “Brian DeVries, the first graduate of a special
state treatment program for violent sexual predators, ended up in a
trailer at the Correctional Training Facility on a judge’s order after
more than 100 Santa Clara County landlords refused to rent to
82
him.”
As California’s story unfolds, state officials are expressing
concern about this public reaction:
80
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The uproar that has accompanied the release of [the first
graduates for the program] has prompted the administration of
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and legislators to reexamine the
eight-year old [SVP] program. “We are concerned about the
difficulties and the growing attention to the placement of these
individuals,” said . . . [the] spokeswoman for the Health and
83
Human Services Agency.

A newspaper headline highlighted the official concern: State Law
Threatened by Public’s Revulsion to Sex Offenders/Legal Challenge Could
84
Result if Predators Are Given Nowhere to Live.
But the experiences of Minnesota and Wisconsin suggest that
the intensity of the public opposition to the release of committed sex
offenders will be too intense for politicians to handle in a deliberate
way. No politician can afford to have any weakness on the issue
exposed. The politicization of the issue severely narrows the
permissible areas of discourse. The developments in Minnesota
suggest that budget concerns are toxic, effectively making any kind of
cost-benefit analysis untouchable. Similarly, the consistent framing of
the issue as reflecting a tension between patient rights and public
safety leaves out any consideration of the principles of selective
incapacitation and the notions of proportionality that it entails.
The political vocabulary introduces the rhetoric of zerotolerance. Thus, a newspaper editorial in Wisconsin ridicules a legal
standard permitting supervised discharges of individuals who fall
below the “substantially probable” standard for original
85
commitment, and a Minnesota prosecutor calls a ten percent
86
recidivism rate “unacceptable.” This is a significant transformation
from the starting position in which the central justification for sex
offender commitments was the legislature’s focus on the few “most
dangerous” offenders.
The political rhetoric tends to shape the problem of sexual
violence in the form of the archetypal “Beauty and the Beast” story,
focusing intense attention on rare but vivid crimes. Such a narrow
framing of the problem renders the huge proportion of sexual
violence relatively invisible. A media commentator in California
highlighted the irony in the enormous public outcry over the
supervised release for three SVP graduates:
83
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It’s worth asking whether such strident resistance is proportional
to the potential threat these ex-convicts pose. Not that the public
shouldn’t be concerned about the ex-offenders’ potential to strike
again. But citizens are overlooking thousands of other released
sex offenders, many of whom are back on the street without any
legal strings. Care to guess how many convicted sex offenders are
believed living freely in California, either paroled or simply
87
released without significant treatment? It’s about 67,000 . . . .

If “Beauty and the Beast” is the template for the problem, then
SVP commitments become the die for the solution. In Minnesota,
the release of Rodriguez was consistently described as a “mistake” that
needed fixing. We must, the papers said, “devise better ways to
88
actually protect the community from sexual predators.” Discussion
focused on SVP commitments as the (only) potential solution. The
direct question posed by the media was why civil commitment was not
pursued for Rodriguez. Civil commitment was identified as the
89
“program designed to secure public safety,” as if this were the only
means of protecting public safety. Thus, civil commitment becomes
the ordinary, rather than the extraordinary, solution.
Unsurprisingly, the key fix for the “mistake” in Minnesota is to
expand the reach of the SVP program. The process by which this
expansion was accomplished is instructive. Prior to the crises,
Minnesota essentially had four categories of risk for released sex
offenders. Three categories related to community notification,
ranging from Level 1 (least risky) to Level 3 (most risky).
Superimposed on that classification scheme was the somewhat
90
separate civil commitment referral process.
In general, only a
fraction of the Level 3 offenders were referred for commitment. The
media response put immense pressure on this system. The theme in
the press after Rodriguez’s arrest was “why was this Level 3 offender
not referred for commitment?”
The question has powerful
resonance because the state defined Level 3 as the “highest” risk. It
was impossible for officials to justify why anyone with this designation
would not be committed. The natural response was to expand
commitment referrals to the entire group of Level 3 offenders. But
there is no reason to think that the arbitrary boundary defining the
87
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bottom of Level 3 will be the last resting point for civil commitment.
When it comes to the politics of sexual violence, shifting blame
is not only acceptable, but necessary. No one wants to be the last one
to have touched the “mistake.” This blame shifting is not only
unseemly, but it also will seriously undercut good public policy. In
the Minnesota story, shifting the blame has meant that the referral
decisions about SVP commitments will be made by eighty-seven
county prosecutors, rather than by a centralized and specialized
91
team.
This decentralization will decrease the chances that a
consistent and evidence-based judgment about who is the “most
dangerous” will be made.
CONCLUSION
The experiences in Minnesota and Wisconsin—echoed in
California and Washington—send an unmistakable message. Once a
state has opened Pandora’s box by adopting an SVP Program, efforts
to limit the growth of such programs will be met with fierce public
opposition.
We might ask why it matters. After all, every predator confined
is a predator from whom we are protected. But it is much more
complicated than that. Every dollar spent on SVP programs is a
dollar that could be spent on the much more ubiquitous, but
relatively invisible, forms of violence against women and children. As
Minnesota politicians exchanged blame and legislators fell over each
other to draft tougher laws for sex offenders, a small group of women
and men protested state funding cuts of $5 million in domestic
92
violence funding.
The story, buried in the B-section of the
newspaper, was a whisper compared to the cacophony generated by
the crises of the previous summer. Yet last year in Hennepin County
(Minneapolis), Minnesota, there were “over 30,000 calls to 911
regarding domestic violence. . . . In the last five years 132 women and
93
68 children under the age of 13 died because of domestic violence.”
The funding and focus on SVP commitments misdirect our focus
and resources away from the “most danger.” By using the Beauty and
the Beast template as our guide in fixing the system, will we have
accomplished a real increase in safety or simply achieved some
reassurance, unsupported by any systemic change, that we have exiled
91
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from our midst the symbolic “beast”?
There is no shortage of responsible officials and commentators
who understand that the Constitution and sound public policy
demand that SVP programs be limited. For example, Dean Steven
McAllister, who spoke at the symposium at which this paper was
presented, is no foe of SVP laws: he helped write the briefs defending
the Kansas SVP law in the United States Supreme Court. Yet Dean
McAllister expressed his disappointment and concern at the failure
94
to limit the actual implementation of these laws. Similarly, officials
in Maryland, Washington, and California appeared to concur with
the judgments of their counterparts in Minnesota and Wisconsin.
Larry Fitch, head of Forensic Services for the Maryland Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene, opined that the Wisconsin SVP
program “is doing the best job of moving people through.” He
continued: “That is what this is supposed to be about—people are
supposed to be treated and integrated back into the community. In
some states, people have bought into the idea that this is simply
95
extended confinement.”
George Bukowski, who runs California’s program, similarly
commented positively about the Wisconsin program: “Maybe we need
96
to talk to people in Wisconsin,” he said. And Mark Seling, head of
the Washington State SVP program, stated: “I think the problem with
the laws has been that the view at the time they were conceived didn’t
account for the whole picture, the mission of treatment and the
process of release. . . . That’s really where the problems lie. We are
97
all trying to learn.”
The lesson to be learned is an expensive one. When Wisconsin’s
SVP law was passed, “officials estimated that 10 people per year would
be committed and that annual operating costs would be around $3.6
98
million.”
Some ten years later, in 2003, operating costs for the
Wisconsin program are $26 million a year, and the physical facility
99
California is slated to spend $350
itself cost about $40 million.
100
million for a facility to house its SVP population.
Costs for the
Minnesota program were projected to rise from $17 million to $76.9
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101

million in the twelve years from 1998 to 2010.
The Wisconsin and Minnesota experiences show that even good
intentions on the part of state officials will be insufficient to hold
these programs to the strict limits they require. Once the politics of
sexual violence attaches, its logic will prevail with no obvious or
logical benchmarks to provide limits.
How can we close Pandora’s box? I propose here a few ideas
that will lead us in that direction:
Shift the underlying framework from addressing the
“most dangerous” to preventing the “most violence.”
The aim of public policy ought to be to have a mix of
tools that are optimized to effect the largest, most
effective reduction in sexual offending.
Base public policy and program design on the growing
body of knowledge about sexual offending. Decisions
about resource allocation and program design ought to
be grounded on empirical knowledge about the diversity,
patterns, causes, prediction, and treatment of sexual
offending.
Prevention programs must be systematically, not
incrementally, built and evaluated. Addressing the “most
violence” requires having a range of interventions and
the ability to allocate resources and risks among those
interventions.
Expansion of expensive, intensive
interventions is hard to resist unless the next most
intensive tool is available and adequately funded.
The politics of sexual violence must be addressed. The
news media must be part of the solution, helping to
reframe public discourse. Basing systems on evidence
and cost-benefit allocations provides public officials
firmer ground than arbitrary, ad hoc design decisions.
Innovations like problem-solving courts should be used
to coordinate and rationalize individual plans for
offender supervision and treatment in the community.
Governments should fund research, development, and
evaluation. Key areas where more knowledge is needed
include: efficacy of treatment and supervision of sex
101
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offenders in the community; identification of “dynamic”
predictors of sexual recidivism; development and
evaluation of broad-based primary (public-health style)
interventions that attempt to change attitudes and
behaviors before sexual abuse occurs; and whether legal
tools such as mandatory reporting and community
notification are, on balance, effective in reducing
violence.

